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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Statutory corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent~

vs.

Case No.
9844

REX H. COX and WILMIN A COX,
his wife,
Defendants-Appellant.

PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF
IN SUPPORT THEREOF

The defendant and appellant, Rex H. Cox, in the
above entitled action respectfully petitions the Court
to grant a rehearing in the above entitled cause for the
reason and upon the grounds that in its opinion heretofore rendered the Court erred in the following particulars:
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POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE LOWER
COURT'S ORDER UNDER RULE 60(b) (1).
POINT TWO
'THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING IN
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE LOWER
COURT'S ORDER UNDER RULE 60(b) (7).
The undersigned attorneys for the Defendant and
Appellant, Rex H. Cox, herein, certify that in our
opinion there is merit to the foregoing claims and that
the court committed errors in the particulars above
specified.
DAHL & SAGERS
Everett E Dahl
Victor G. Sagers
Attorneys for Defendantand Appellant

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE LOWER
COlTRT'S ORDER UNDER RULE 60(b) (1).
It is not counsel's purpose to further quote extensively from previous decisions of this court nor to reite4
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rate what has already been said in our original and
reply briefs. However, the lower court definitely abused
its discretion in not setting aside the judgment under
Rule 60 (b) (I) of our Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and this court erred in affirming said lower court's order.
'Ve believe the Utah General Rule of Law applicable to Rule 60 (b) (I) to be that the court views a
default judgment with a careful eye but in doing so
we acknowledge that a trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in granting or denying
a motion to set aside a judgment. However, it is an
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a judgment
where there is reasonable justification for the defendant's failure to appear and answer and the court will
grant relief in doubtful cases so that a party may have
a hearing. Mayhew v. Standard Gil.~onite Company~ 14
Utah 2d 52, 376 P 2d 951; Ney v. Harrison~ 5 Utah
2d 217, 299 P 2nd 1114; Warren 11. Dixon Ranch Co.~
260 P 2nd 741; Petersen v. Crosier, 29 Utah 255, 81 P.
860.
This court in its decision states:
" ... the court was not obliged to believe the
somewhat feeble excuse he gave him for not paying attention to the summons: that he thought it
required a judge's signature."
This in itself may be one thing, but we submit that
the entire pleadings and fact situation must be reviewed
as one rather than an isolated statement. The record
will bear out that the defendant was thoroughly con-
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fused and of course was somewhat frightened because
of his response to questions propounded to him. In
the instant case the defendant's home is involved, the
defendant was definitely under the impression that no
contract had been entered into, and rightfully so, no
money had been paid him, negotiations had not been
completed and had been extended over a period of approximately eighteen months, therefore, these reasons,
coupled with other reasonable statements contained in
the record along this line would make it very obvious
that the defendant did not understand the effect of his
failure to answer the complaint. It is inconceivable to
believe that if the defendant had understood the effect
of his failure to answer the complaint and that by his
not answering that he would be deprived of an opportunity to present his side of the case to the court and
to haYe the issues litigated that he would not have done
so.
Certainly any of the foregoing reasons would appear to be justification for the judgment to be set aside
and one in which the interest of justice and fair play
would be involved.
It is an obvious abuse of discretion, and a sad
commentary, I might add, where a decision is returned
on the basis that the court does not like the demeanor
of the defendant on the witness stand as was done in
the instant case. The general rule, of course, is that the
court should be inclined to allow justice and fair play
and allow the defendant a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the case.
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POINT TWO
TI-lE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING IN
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE LOWER
COURT'S ORDER UNDER RULE 60(b) (7).
The court in its decision, the subject of this Petition
for Rehearing, states as follows:
"In his reasons for setting the judgment aside
the defendant has specifically set out number
one above and evidently in an effort to qualify
under the second category has asserted the following additional reasons: ( 1) the judgment
entered was based upon a void contract for the
reason that the same did not comply with the
Statute of Frauds; (2) the purported contract
was void for lack of consideration ; ( 3) the j udgment is inequitable."
The very essence of Rule 60 (b) (7) is that the judgment may be set aside for any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. Certainly
if the judgment is void on its face, or if it is inequitable,
which of course is the very essence of an equity proceeding, then of course this in itself is sufficient to set
aside the judgment.
We will treat ( 1) and ( 2) referred to above together. The facts and evidence show that exhibits 1-D,
2-D, 3-D, and 4-D were placed into evidence by mutual
consent and were actually obtained from plaintiff's
counsel at the time of the hearing by the lower court.
Exhibit 1-D, dated February 20, 1961, is a carbon copy
of a purported option to purchase in the sum of $43,-
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500.00. There is no question that this offer was rejected.
Exhibit 2-D dated April 17, 1961, signed by the de-

fendant, is a rejection of a purported verbal offer of
$40,000.00 and a proffer of a compromise of $42,000.00.
This offer, signed only by the defendant, Rex H. Cox,
was also rejected verbally by the plaintiff and negotiations continued. Exhibit 3-D is an offer by this defendant to sell only a portion of his property for the sum
of $35,000.00 and said letter is dated June 6, 1962,
some fourteen months later than Exhibit 2-D, which,
of course, is evidence that the proposal set forth in
Exhibit 2-D was rejected. Exhibit 4-D dated August
3, 1962, is still another offer and, of course, it is evident
that this was rejected inasmuch as a law suit was instituted. The foregoing is conclusive evidence that there
was never any meeting of the minds and that no valid
contract exists.
The judgment must be in conformity with the
pleadings and proof. Miller v. Johnson~ 43 Utah 468,
134 P. 1017, -1!8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 294. The complaint
of the plaintiff (R. 1-4) states that on April 17, 1961
the defendants offered to sell plaintiff certain real property located in Salt Lake Count~, but plaintiff does
not attach any offer nor specify any amounts or terms
in connection with said offer. The plaintiff further
states in its complaint, above referred to, that the Board
of Education accepted and offer on April 18, 1961,
but does not refer to what offer or the terms, etc., and, of
course, it is an erroneous allegation as it is Yery eYident
by the evidence set forth in the record and as Exhibits
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3-D and 4-D bear out. Also the Judgment By Default
(R. 8-9) does not even specify any certain contract of
sale or terms and we quote from the record at page 8:

"That the said plaintiff be and it is hereby
granted specific performance of the agreement to
sell that certain property located in Salt Lake
County ... "
The above does not refer to any specific contract or any
amount and the complaint was void of same also. The
entry of default (I-t. 10) as well as statements and
admissions made by counsel at the previous hearing of
this cause, upon invitation by members of the court,
definitely shows that no contract of any nature, kind,
or date was produced at the time the default was taken
nor was any contract of any kind ever reduced to judgment at the time of granting said default judgment
or any time thereafter. How in good conscience can any
court permit such an injustice to stand and to deprive
this defendant of his day in court and a trial of the case
upon its merits?
A law-making power cannot validate void judgments and the same rule would apply to our court.
In Re Christiansen.. 17 Utah 412, 53 P. 103, 41 L.R.A.
504, 7 Am. St. Rep. 794. If the judgment is void on its
face or is void from the record and the evidence, then
this alone is sufficient grounds to set aside the judgment as to let it stand would be highly inequitable, to
say the least. Furthermore, the court on its own motion
could set aside judgment if it had not properly granted
it, as was done here.
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The inequities alone as created by the judgment
as it now stands is sufficient basis under which to set
aside the judgment. The lower court has created a twoheaded monstrosity incapable of enforcement to say
the least, so ambiguous that the parties will be back
up before this court upon attempting to enforce the
judgment if it is allowed to stand as such. The judgment as now rendered does not clearly define the parties'
respective interests. Since the judgment against Wilmina Cox has been vacated does this mean that Rex H.
Cox now has a judgment for $42,000.00 for his interest
in the property, $20,000.00, $5,000.00, or some other
amount, i.e.-just what are the defendants' individual
rights under the judgment rendered by the lower court?

CONCLUSION
We believe Justice 'Vade in his dissenting opinion
sets forth the position of the defendant, Rex H. Cox,
and we therefore quote his dissenting opinion in its
entirety and adopt same as our conclusion.
"I think it obviously an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to refuse to set aside this default.
The purpose of courts is to decide questions of
law and facts on their merit after a fair and
i1npartial trial, and promote justice under the
law. Decisions on procedural defects should not
be encouraged. Here the defendants were served
with su1nmons, they were not lawyers and obYiously did not understand that the effect of their
failure to answer the complaint would be to deprive them of an opportunity to present their
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side of the case to the court and have the issues
litigated. As I understand the facts the trial
court did set the judgment aside as against the
wife and she will be allowed to have a hearing
on the merits although the property in question
is owned as joint tenants by the husband and
wife. To me it seems that the court in making
this kind of a decision went a lqng way to prevent
a trial on the merits against a layman who obviously did not appreciate the effect of his failure
to consult a lawyer and file an answer. For the
same issues as to the wife's interest must be
tried, although the interests of the husband and
wife are generally so closely connected that the
failure to vacate the judgment as against the
husband must seriously affect the interests of the
wife in this property."
The judgment of the lower court refusing to set
aside the default judgment as to this defendant should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAHL & SAGERS
Everett E Dahl
Victor G. Sagers
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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